Mirror Neurons: Root of Empathy?
Watch someone reach for a cup. Your brain does not necessarily treat the movement as a purely visual event. Some of the neural machinery involved in performing an action also responds when you observe someone else performing it. In the early 1990s, researchers discovered neurons in the premotor cortex of macaque monkeys that responded both when the animal grasped an object and when it watched another individual do the same. They called them mirror neurons. 1
The discovery was real. The explanations built on it became considerably more ambitious.
Why would evolution produce them?
Imagine living in a small hunter-gatherer group. Your survival depends partly on predicting what other people will do. You need to coordinate a hunt, learn skills by watching others, recognize when someone is frightened, and anticipate whether another person’s actions are threatening or cooperative.
A brain that efficiently connects the observation of actions with its own motor representations could be useful in this environment. More broadly, natural selection had reasons to favour the ability to learn from others, anticipate their behaviour, and navigate social relationships.
But there is a distinction between explaining why a capacity might be useful and explaining how it evolved. Mirror neurons have been discovered in macaques, so mirror-like mechanisms are not uniquely human. Their evolutionary history may extend well before our species. Moreover, some researchers argue that mirror properties can emerge through associative learning: repeatedly seeing actions while performing them gradually connects their sensory and motor representations. On this account, evolution may have provided the learning machinery without designing a dedicated system for empathy. 2
The same evolutionary reasoning applies to tribalism. Recognizing who belongs to your group, learning its conventions, and cooperating with its members could all have been advantageous. But this does not mean that evolution produced one specific mechanism for tribalism, just as it does not establish that mirror neurons evolved specifically for empathy.
Empathy as a defence mechanism
There is another possibility worth considering. What if sensitivity to other people’s behaviour is not always about cooperation or empathy, but sometimes about survival?
Imagine a child growing up in an unpredictable environment. A parent’s mood can change suddenly. The tone of a voice, a facial expression, the sound of footsteps, or a seemingly insignificant movement can signal whether something pleasant or frightening is about to happen.
For such a child, accurately anticipating other people’s behaviour becomes unusually important. Missing a signal may have consequences. The child may therefore become highly attentive to subtle changes in other people’s expressions, voices, and movements, constantly trying to predict what will happen next.
This is not merely speculation about development. Research on childhood adversity suggests that threatening environments can shape developing stress and emotion-processing systems. Some studies have found altered responses to emotional faces, including heightened sensitivity to potential threats. But the findings do not imply that adversity reliably produces a general ability to read other people more accurately. 3
The interesting distinction is between empathy and hypervigilance. Someone who anticipates other people’s emotional states may genuinely be empathetic, but they may also be monitoring those states because doing so once helped them feel safe. What looks like an exceptional ability to understand others can sometimes be partly a learned strategy for predicting danger.
Could mirror neurons be involved in this process? Possibly, as part of the broader machinery connecting the perception of actions with our own representations of them. But there is no strong evidence that mirror neurons specifically cause developmental hypervigilance. Attention, learning, memory, and the brain’s threat-processing systems are also likely to matter.
Perhaps, then, some of the same social sensitivity that enables cooperation can also be recruited for self-protection. The capacity to notice another person’s intentions is useful in either case; what differs is the problem the individual is trying to solve.
What do we actually know?
The strongest evidence for mirror neurons concerns the relationship between observing and performing actions. Claims that they explain empathy, intention-reading, or even language require additional evidence. In humans, many studies rely on fMRI and other indirect measures, which cannot ordinarily establish that the same individual neurons respond during both action and observation.
Research continues to refine the picture. A central question is whether mirror-like responses are largely an evolved specialization, a product of sensorimotor learning, or some combination of the two. These explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive: evolution can shape the learning mechanisms through which experience builds neural representations. 2
The evidence therefore supports a more modest conclusion than the popular story suggests. Mirror neurons may be one component of a much broader system through which we learn from, predict, and respond to others. They are not, by themselves, an explanation for human sociality.
Perhaps the deeper question is how evolution and experience interact to shape the ways we understand one another. Some capacities may have been favoured because they helped our ancestors cooperate. Others may emerge, or become exaggerated, because an individual’s environment makes certain skills especially important. The same sensitivity can serve different purposes in different contexts.
A mechanism that helps us anticipate another person’s actions is not necessarily a mechanism for empathy. And a tendency that was useful in one environment may become costly in another.
Understanding human behaviour may therefore require more than asking what a trait evolved for. We must also ask how it develops, what problems it solves, and what happens when the environment changes.
References
Rizzolatti, G., & Craighero, L. (2004). The mirror-neuron system. Annual Review of Neuroscience, 27, 169–192. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.neuro.27.070203.144230 ↩︎
Heyes, C. (2010). Where do mirror neurons come from? Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 34(4), 575–583. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.neubiorev.2009.11.007 ↩︎ ↩︎
McCrory, E., De Brito, S. A., & Viding, E. (2011). The impact of childhood maltreatment: A review of neurobiological and genetic factors. Frontiers in Psychiatry, 2, 48. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyt.2011.00048 ↩︎