The Future Has Happened and The Past is Going to Happen
The ordinary understanding of time rests on a seemingly self-evident distinction: the past has happened, the present is happening, and the future has not happened yet. Events enter existence, occupy the present, and eventually become part of the past. Reality, as experienced, seems to continuously emerge into existence, leaving behind what was and approaching what is not yet.
This picture carries an implicit metaphysical assumption: that the present has a special status that neither the past nor the future possesses. Modern physics complicates this assumption and the subjective experience introduces more nuance.
In the framework of relativity, there is no universal present shared by all observers. The distinction between past, present, and future cannot be straightforwardly applied to the entire universe independently of a reference frame. This creates an opening for a radically different conception of temporal reality: the possibility that past, present, and future events are all equally real, occupying different positions within a four-dimensional spacetime structure.
Under this conception, the future has already happened—not in the ordinary chronological sense, but in the sense that its events are no less part of reality than events located in the past. The universe does not necessarily acquire new events as time passes. Instead, what appears to be the passage of time may be a feature of the perspective of observers situated within spacetime.
Yet this picture becomes considerably more complicated when quantum mechanics enters the discussion. Quantum mechanics assigns probabilities to measurement outcomes, and its mathematical formalism does not straightforwardly describe a single definite outcome before measurement. If the future already exists, what exactly is uncertain about a quantum event? Is the outcome already a fact in spacetime, or does it become definite only through measurement?
The problem becomes even more radical when quantum gravity is considered. Perhaps time itself is not a fundamental feature of reality. If so, the distinction between past, present, and future might not merely lack a universal reference point. It might emerge from a more fundamental description that contains no external time parameter at all.
But this introduces another difficulty, one that is perhaps more difficult to formulate than the preceding questions.
If all events are equally real, and if there is no fundamental present, what does this mean for the existence of subjective experience? A person who suffered a century ago remains part of the spacetime history. Is that person still suffering? Does each observer have its own privileged present? Why is any particular physical configuration accompanied by a first-person experience?
These questions connect the ontology of spacetime, quantum mechanics, the emergence of time, and the nature of consciousness. More fundamentally, they raise a question about what it means for anything to happen.
1. The disappearance of the universal present
In everyday experience, the present appears to be a universal boundary separating two distinct regions of existence. Everything before this boundary belongs to the past, while everything after it belongs to the future. There seems to be little reason to question this arrangement, because ordinary human experience takes place within a relatively small region of spacetime where these distinctions are practically unambiguous.
Special relativity introduces a fundamental complication. The relativity of simultaneity establishes that spatially separated events that are simultaneous according to one reference frame need not be simultaneous according to another. Two observers moving relative to each other can disagree about which distant events occur at the same time, without either observer being physically mistaken.
This is not merely a technical correction to the measurement of time. It raises an ontological question: if there is no observer-independent definition of simultaneity for distant events, what exactly constitutes the universal present?
Consider two events occurring at distant locations, separated in such a way that neither can causally influence the other. Depending on the reference frame, one event may be considered earlier than the other, or both may be considered simultaneous. There is no invariant ordering between them.
The problem becomes particularly significant for philosophical theories that assign a special ontological status to the present. Presentism, for example, maintains that only present events exist. But if there is no universal present, defining the totality of what exists becomes difficult. Which events exist, and which do not, would appear to depend on the observer’s reference frame.
This is one of the reasons relativity has motivated the block-universe interpretation of spacetime. According to eternalism, events do not acquire or lose existence simply because of their temporal location. Past, present, and future events are all part of reality. The distinction between them concerns their temporal relationships rather than their existence.
In this interpretation, spacetime is not a three-dimensional universe continuously being replaced by another three-dimensional universe. It is a four-dimensional structure in which events occupy different temporal and spatial coordinates.
The event of a person being born, the event of that person suffering, and an event occurring centuries later are different locations within the same spacetime structure. None needs to be more real than another merely because of its temporal position.
It is important, however, to distinguish what relativity establishes from the philosophical interpretation built upon it. The relativity of simultaneity creates serious difficulties for a universal present, but it does not mathematically prove eternalism. The block universe is a significant interpretation of modern spacetime physics, not an experimentally established conclusion about the metaphysics of existence.
2. Existence is not the same as determinism
A common objection to the block universe is that it appears to imply determinism. If the future already exists, the argument goes, then everything that happens must have been determined from the beginning. This conclusion does not necessarily follow.
Two different questions are being combined here. The first concerns the existence of events: are events located in the future as real as events located in the past? The second concerns the determination of events: are future states uniquely fixed by previous states and the laws of nature? The first is a question about the ontology of time. The second is a question about the dynamical structure of physical laws.
A deterministic theory implies that a complete specification of the state of a system, together with its laws of evolution, uniquely determines its subsequent states. Classical Newtonian mechanics provides a familiar example of such a framework. Eternalism, however, does not by itself require that the physical laws be deterministic. A universe governed by probabilistic physical laws could still be described as a complete spacetime history. A particular event could occupy a definite location in that history without having been uniquely determined by the preceding state of the universe.
A complete description of what actually happens is not necessarily a demonstration that what happens was inevitable. Quantum mechanics makes this distinction considerably more interesting.
3. The Quantum Measurement Problem
Quantum mechanics does not ordinarily describe physical systems as possessing definite values for every measurable quantity before measurement.
Consider an electron prepared in a quantum state with its spin oriented along the positive x-axis. If its spin is subsequently measured along the z-axis, quantum mechanics predicts two possible outcomes: spin-up and spin-down, each with a probability of one half.
The state can be expressed as:
$$ |+x\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( |+z\rangle + |-z\rangle \right) $$The Born rule gives:
$$ P(+z)=|\langle +z|+x\rangle|^2 =\frac{1}{2} $$ $$ P(-z)=|\langle -z|+x\rangle|^2 =\frac{1}{2} $$Before measurement, the mathematical description contains a superposition of the two possible outcomes. The problem is not simply that the outcome cannot be predicted. Quantum mechanics describes the evolution of the system through the Schrödinger equation, but applying this evolution to the complete experimental arrangement creates a difficulty.
The measuring apparatus is itself a physical system. If the electron interacts with it, quantum mechanics should describe the combined system rather than treating the apparatus as something external to the theory.
The resulting state is schematically:
$$ |\Psi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}} \left( |+z\rangle|A_+\rangle + |-z\rangle|A_-\rangle \right) $$Here, the apparatus has become entangled with the electron. One component corresponds to the apparatus recording spin-up, while the other corresponds to it recording spin-down. But ordinary experiments produce definite records. A detector displays one result, not a visible superposition of two different readings.
This is the measurement problem: how should the mathematical description of a superposition be reconciled with the existence of definite measurement outcomes? Different interpretations of quantum mechanics offer different answers.
In collapse theories, measurement produces a definite outcome, potentially through a genuinely stochastic physical process. In Bohmian mechanics, additional physical variables determine the outcomes through a deterministic but nonlocal theory. In the many-worlds interpretation, the universal wavefunction does not collapse, and different outcomes become realized in different branches. These approaches do not give us one universally accepted account of what is happening. This issue is directly relevant to the block universe.
If a future measurement has a definite spacetime location, does that location already contain one definite outcome? Or does it contain multiple possible outcomes? The answer depends on how quantum mechanics is interpreted.
In a single-outcome interpretation, the complete history would contain a particular measurement result. In many-worlds, the description contains different outcome branches. In deterministic hidden-variable approaches, the result depends on additional physical information.
Quantum mechanics therefore complicates the block universe, but does not straightforwardly disprove it. There is no established result showing that quantum measurement requires the continuous creation of new moments or that the future cannot be part of a complete spacetime description.
4. Beyond the Block Universe: What if time does not exist at all?
The block universe offers a radical departure from ordinary temporal experience. The past, present, and future are equally real, and the apparent passage of time does not correspond to the continuous creation of new moments. But this picture retains something fundamental: time itself.
Events still occupy temporal locations, and the distinction between earlier and later remains part of the structure of reality. What happens if even this assumption is abandoned? The problem becomes apparent when general relativity is combined with quantum mechanics.
In ordinary quantum mechanics, time is an external parameter. A physical system has a quantum state that evolves with respect to time, according to the Schrödinger equation:
$$ i\hbar\frac{\partial}{\partial t}\Psi = \hat H\Psi $$General relativity treats spacetime differently. Space and time are not fixed backgrounds in which physical processes occur. They are dynamical components of the gravitational field. When attempts are made to quantize gravity using the canonical formalism, a difficulty emerges. The resulting Wheeler–DeWitt equation does not contain an ordinary external time parameter governing the evolution of the universal wavefunction.
In a simplified notation:
$$ \hat{\mathcal H}\Psi[h_{ij},\phi]=0 $$Here, \$h_{ij}\$ represents the spatial geometry, \$\phi\$ represents matter fields, and \$\hat{\mathcal H}\$ represents the Hamiltonian constraint operator. There is no external \$t\$ with respect to which the wavefunction of the universe evolves. This is commonly associated with the problem of time in quantum gravity.
The implication is not simply that time stops at the fundamental level. Rather, the mathematical formulation raises the question of how temporal evolution, as described by ordinary physical theories, can emerge from a more fundamental description that does not employ an external time parameter.
Such a possibility is more radical than the block universe. It does not merely suggest that all moments exist simultaneously, but questions whether the notion of moments is fundamental at all.
One possibility is that time is relational rather than fundamental.
Time through correlations
Consider a universe divided into two subsystems: a clock and the rest of the physical system. The clock has different possible readings. Each reading is correlated with a particular state of the remaining system.
For example:
| Clock reading | State of the system |
|---|---|
| 1 | A |
| 2 | B |
| 3 | C |
| 4 | D |
An observer who uses the clock can describe the system as evolving from state A to state B, then to C and D. The observer therefore obtains an effective description of temporal evolution. But the complete clock-system state can be stationary. Its description does not require an external time parameter. This is the central idea behind the Page–Wootters mechanism. Time can emerge from quantum correlations between a clock subsystem and the rest of a larger system.
In this picture, the universe does not need an external clock. Its internal subsystems can function as clocks for one another. The global description can be timeless while its internal observers experience temporal evolution. This does not establish that the universe is actually timeless. The Page–Wootters construction has specific assumptions and technical limitations, and its relation to quantum gravity remains an active subject of investigation. Recent work continues to examine how internal clocks can be measured consistently within this framework.
5. Does the past and future exist in a timeless universe?
This introduces a distinction between two different conceptions of reality. In the block universe, time exists as a dimension of spacetime. Events have temporal coordinates, and past, present, and future events are all part of the same four-dimensional structure. In a fundamentally timeless description, even this might be too much.
There may not be a fundamental temporal dimension in which all events are arranged. Spacetime itself could emerge from a more fundamental physical structure. Consequently, it would be misleading to imagine a timeless universe as simply a block universe with the flow of time removed.
The block universe says that all temporal locations exist. A timeless fundamental description might instead say that temporal locations are not part of the fundamental description at all.
But does this mean the past and future do not exist? The answer depends on the level of description. At the fundamental level, there might be no meaningful distinction between past and future because there is no external temporal parameter defining them. At the emergent level, however, temporal relations may become meaningful.
A physical system can function as a clock. Other systems can be described relative to its readings. Their states can exhibit an ordered sequence, even though the complete description does not evolve with respect to an external time.
The past and future could therefore be meaningful within an emergent description without being fundamental regions of reality. The distinction is similar to other emergent physical properties. Temperature is meaningful at the macroscopic level, although its description depends on the statistical properties of microscopic degrees of freedom.
Likewise, temporal succession might be meaningful at the level of observers and physical systems without being part of the fundamental description. This possibility does not establish that spacetime is emergent in our universe. It illustrates the conceptual distinction between fundamental timelessness and emergent temporal structure.
6. The Observer’s Present: Is Subjective Experience Privileged?
A further difficulty remains. The disappearance of a universal present does not eliminate the fact that every conscious experience appears to occur in a present.
A person does not experience their life as a complete four-dimensional structure. Experience is situated. There is something that it is like to occupy a particular perspective, to remember earlier events, and to anticipate later ones.
Even if all events are equally real, each conscious experience seems to have its own here and now. This raises a question that the block universe does not automatically answer: is subjective experience privileged in some sense?
The answer requires distinguishing several different forms of privilege.
The first-person perspective
Consider two people, A and B.
A is experiencing suffering in the year 1900. B is reading about A’s suffering in 2026. From a block-universe perspective, both experiences belong to spacetime. Neither is more real merely because one occurs earlier.
But there is an asymmetry:
- A experiences the suffering.
- B observes or reconstructs the suffering.
- B cannot directly occupy A’s first-person perspective merely by knowing the physical circumstances of the event.
There is something different about experiencing pain and knowing that another person experienced pain. This is the problem of phenomenal consciousness: why does a particular physical process have a first-person character at all?
A physical description can specify brain states, neural activity, sensory processes, and their temporal relationships. But the question of why these processes are accompanied by subjective experience remains a separate philosophical and scientific problem. Eternalism does not eliminate this problem. It simply incorporates conscious experiences into the spacetime description.
Every observer has its own present
Consider the spatial notion of here. There is no universally privileged location called here. A person in Tokyo experiences Tokyo as here, while a person in Zurich experiences Zurich as here. Neither location is objectively more central to the universe. Yet each observer has a perfectly meaningful sense of being located somewhere.
Perhaps temporal experience has a similar structure. A person living in 1900 experiences 1900 as now. A person living in 2026 experiences 2026 as now. The fact that these presents are temporally separated does not make one person’s experience of presentness less genuine than the other’s. The analogy is not exact, but it captures an important distinction.
There need not be one universal present for each conscious perspective to have its own present. Expressions such as I, here, and now convey information about a subject’s position or perspective, rather than merely describing the world independently of that position.
A complete description of the universe could specify all the events and their relationships. But a subject may still need to locate itself within that description. Knowing everything about the world is conceptually different from knowing which observer or observer-moment constitutes one’s own perspective.
Three different kinds of privilege
The question of whether subjective experience is privileged can therefore be separated into three claims.
Epistemic privilege: A subject has direct access to its own experiences in a way that other observers do not. Other people can infer or reconstruct those experiences, but they do not thereby become the original subject.
Indexical privilege: Every subject experiences the world from a particular here and now. This is a fact about its position and perspective, rather than necessarily a fact about the universe as a whole.
Ontological privilege: The present experience of a particular observer is objectively more real than other experiences or events.
The first two do not automatically establish the third. The block universe rejects the idea of a uniquely privileged present in the global spacetime structure. But it does not follow that first-person experience disappears or that every observer’s temporal perspective becomes meaningless.
Perhaps the present is not an objective property of the universe as a whole, but a perspectival feature of conscious systems situated within it. This remains a philosophical proposal rather than an established result of physics.
7. Is someone who suffered in the past still suffering?
The implications become particularly important when considering individual lives. Consider a person who lived at 1900 and experienced two seconds of extreme suffering. If eternalism is correct, that experience has not disappeared from reality. It remains part of the person’s spacetime history. But does this mean that the person is still suffering? The question confuses the existence of an event with the duration of the experience constituting that event.
Suppose the beginning and end of the experience are represented by two events, \$E_1\$ and \$E_2\$. The person experiences suffering during the interval connecting them. In a four-dimensional description, this interval remains part of spacetime. But its duration does not become infinite simply because the complete spacetime structure includes it.
The distinction is:
- The person suffered during that interval.
- The suffering has a particular temporal duration along the person’s worldline.
- The fact that the interval exists in spacetime does not extend it indefinitely.
In other words, eternal existence is not eternal duration. The block universe does not imply that the person continuously relives the suffering. There is no additional subject outside spacetime who must continually re-experience every event in the block.
Nor does an observer examining the entire spacetime structure see the person suffering for eternity. The complete four-dimensional description is not itself a conscious observer (though this can be seriously argued). It is a representation of the relationships between events. The issue can also be approached through the four-dimensionalist understanding of personal identity.
Rather than treating a person as an entity that exists only at one instantaneous moment, four-dimensionalism describes a person’s life as extended through time. Different temporal stages belong to the same life, with different experiences, physical states, and memories.
The person who suffered and the person who later recovered are different temporal stages of the same life. The suffering belongs to the life, but it does not characterize every stage of it. This does not make the suffering less real. It means that its temporal extent is limited.
But what about the first-person experience?
The historical person does not merely have a physical coordinate in spacetime. At the relevant temporal location, there is an experience of suffering. At that location, the suffering is experienced as present. For an observer in 2026, it is past. For the person experiencing it, it is the present experience.
This is a subtle but important consequence. The past event is not experienced by the present observer, but that does not mean the event lacked its own first-person present.
The fact that an experience belongs to the past of another observer does not imply that it was never present to the person who experienced it. This applies equally to every conscious experience: pain, happiness, fear, discovery, and ordinary perception. The existence of an experience is not determined by whether it is currently present from another observer’s perspective.
8. What does it mean to be this Observer?
The previous discussion raises a further question. Suppose the spacetime structure contains an enormous number of conscious experiences. Why is one particular experience associated with the feeling of being me, rather than another? Why is experience associated with a particular location in spacetime?
A complete physical description might specify every observer, every brain state, and every event. But describing all these states does not automatically explain why any particular state has a first-person character.
There are actually two distinct problems here.
The first is the problem of consciousness: why is a physical process accompanied by subjective experience?
The second is the problem of self-location: what does it mean for a particular experience to be experienced from the perspective of this subject, here and now?
These problems should not be conflated.
The first concerns the relationship between physical processes and phenomenal consciousness. The second concerns the relationship between a complete description of the world and the perspective of an observer situated within it.
A block universe can describe a person’s complete history, but this does not automatically explain how personal identity and first-person experience should be understood across its different temporal stages.
Does a person move through the block, successively encountering different experiences? That description introduces an additional process of temporal passage, and potentially an external time in which the person moves.
Alternatively, is the person simply a temporally extended entity, with different conscious experiences occupying different locations within that entity’s history?
The second description is more consistent with four-dimensionalism. But it still leaves open why each conscious experience has its own first-person character. The question of whether there is an additional fact about which observer-moment is mine cannot simply be resolved by listing all the physical events in the universe. This is where the distinction between a third-person description and a first-person perspective becomes particularly important.
9. The Observer’s Own Clock: Relational and Subjective Time
The problem becomes even more interesting if time itself is not fundamental. If temporal succession emerges from correlations within a timeless physical structure, an observer’s experience of time may also require a relational explanation.
The Page–Wootters mechanism offers one possible starting point. An observer uses an internal physical system as a clock and describes other systems relative to its state. The observer experiences a sequence of conditional states rather than an evolution with respect to an external universal time.
The observer’s present is therefore associated with a particular clock reading and the physical state correlated with it. This suggests that the temporal perspective of an observer need not be defined by a universal present. It may be constructed from the physical relationships available to that observer.
There is another mathematical idea that makes this possibility particularly interesting: modular flow. Given an algebra of observables and a suitable state, modular theory defines a canonical flow. In finite-dimensional settings, it can be represented schematically as:
$$ \sigma_s^\omega(A)= \rho^{is}A\rho^{-is} $$Here, the state determines the flow associated with the algebra. Unlike ordinary time evolution, the parameter \$s\$ is not necessarily an externally imposed physical clock reading. It is generated by the mathematical relationship between the algebra and its state.
This provides a possible way to investigate temporal structure from within a system rather than assuming an external clock. However, a distinction is essential. Modular flow is established mathematical structure. Identifying it with subjective time or cognitive evolution is an additional hypothesis, not an established result of physics or neuroscience.
It also does not independently explain the thermodynamic arrow of time. Modular flow can be reversible, whereas memory formation and the accumulation of records are associated with thermodynamic irreversibility. This suggests that several different aspects of temporal experience need to be distinguished:
- Relational physical time, associated with correlations between physical systems.
- Modular flow, associated with an algebra-state pair.
- Subjective time, associated with the temporal organization of conscious experience.
- Thermodynamic time, associated with entropy gradients and irreversible physical processes.
These concepts may be related, but they are not interchangeable. A timeless global description could contain physical relationships from which clocks, records, and observer-dependent temporal structures emerge. Whether modular theory provides a deeper mathematical connection to subjective temporal experience remains an open question.
10. Why do we remember the past but not the future?
Even if the present is perspectival, a further asymmetry remains. The past is remembered, while the future is anticipated. Physical records contain information about earlier events. Decisions appear to influence what happens later, not what happened previously.
This asymmetry is closely related to the thermodynamic arrow of time. The second law of thermodynamics states that the entropy of an isolated system does not decrease in ordinary macroscopic processes. In the familiar history of the universe, the earlier cosmic state had remarkably low entropy, while entropy has generally increased toward later times.
This entropy gradient is closely connected to the asymmetry between past and future. Memories, photographs, computer records, and other physical traces are produced through processes consistent with the thermodynamic arrow. They carry information about earlier conditions. There is no equivalent collection of ordinary physical records encoding future events.
The distinction between past and future is therefore not merely a matter of psychological preference. It is associated with physical conditions under which observers exist and acquire information.
A block universe does not necessarily eliminate this asymmetry. It requires an explanation of where it comes from. The fact that observers remember the past but not the future may be connected to the universe’s low-entropy boundary conditions and the physical processes that produce records.
In this sense, the temporal perspective of an observer is not independent of the thermodynamic history of the universe. The observer’s present is structured by records of the past and expectations concerning the future. This does not establish that the past and future are ontologically different. It provides a possible physical explanation for why they are experienced differently.
11. Perhaps the Universe Does Not Have a Present
The discussion now leads to several distinct possibilities. In presentism, only the present exists. In eternalism, past, present, and future events are equally real within spacetime.
In a fundamentally timeless description, even the temporal dimension might not be part of the fundamental ontology. Temporal relations could emerge from physical correlations within a more fundamental structure. These are different positions, and none should be treated as an automatic consequence of the others.
But something interesting emerges when the observer is included in the discussion. Perhaps the present is not a universal property of the universe. Perhaps it is a feature of the relationship between an observer and its own physical state. Each observer has a temporal perspective. It has records, memories, expectations, and a sequence of experiences. Its present is the present from which these relationships are organized.
There is no reason to assume that all such perspectives must correspond to one universal present. This does not mean that every observer experiences everything simultaneously. Nor does it imply that the observer can choose which temporal position it occupies.
It means that the existence of many first-person perspectives does not necessarily require a privileged temporal boundary separating what exists from what does not. The universe might contain a physical structure in which temporal order emerges differently for different internal observers.
The question then changes. Instead of asking where the universal present is, it becomes necessary to ask how an observer acquires its particular temporal perspective, and what physical or more fundamental structure makes that perspective possible.
12. What Does It Mean for Something to Happen?
The ordinary conception of time assumes that reality continuously becomes. Events happen, enter the present, and eventually become part of the past. The future is still waiting, while the past has already disappeared.
Relativity challenges the idea of a universal present. Quantum mechanics complicates the status of future measurement outcomes. Quantum gravity raises the possibility that time itself is not fundamental.
The block universe offers one way to interpret these developments: past, present, and future events may all be equally real within a four-dimensional spacetime structure.
But the possibility of fundamental timelessness goes further. Perhaps there is no universal temporal dimension in which the universe moves. Perhaps temporal order emerges through relationships between physical systems, with internal clocks providing a description of change and observers acquiring their own temporal perspectives.
This does not mean that the past and future are simply nonexistent. It means that their existence may not be fundamental in the way ordinary experience suggests.
The question of subjective experience adds another dimension to the problem. Even if there is no objectively privileged present, every conscious experience appears to have its own first-person here and now. Every observer occupies a particular perspective within the physical structure, and that perspective cannot simply be replaced by a description of the universe from nowhere.
The suffering of a person centuries ago remains part of the history of reality, but its existence does not mean that the person suffers eternally. Their experience occupied a particular interval in their life. At that interval, it was their present. At another interval, it was no longer their present. The existence of all these experiences within a complete description does not imply that they are all continuously being experienced by one subject.
Yet the deeper question remains: why does reality contain first-person perspectives at all, and why does each perspective have its own present?
A timeless physical description might explain how temporal relations emerge. A relational account might explain how an internal clock allows a system to experience change. An algebraic description might provide a mathematical structure for the observer’s internal flow.
But explaining the existence of an observer’s temporal structure is not yet explaining why that structure is accompanied by subjective experience.
Perhaps the distinction between a universe that exists and a universe that is continuously coming into existence is not a distinction that current physics can resolve. What physics has established is that the ordinary conception of a universal present is inadequate to describe spacetime, that quantum measurement cannot be understood through classical assumptions alone, and that the role of time becomes substantially more complicated when gravity becomes quantum.
The future may already exist in the sense suggested by eternalism. Or perhaps the concepts of past and future themselves emerge from a more fundamental structure in which there is no external time. Either way, the question is no longer simply whether the future has happened or whether the past is still real. It is what it means for an event to happen, for an observer to experience it, and for a universe without a universal present to contain beings for whom there is always a present.
Perhaps the deepest question is not where we are going in time, but why there is a temporal perspective from which anything can be experienced at all.