History, as I use the word here, is more than the succession of events. It is the organization of events into a meaningful account: actions, consequences, conflicts, and purposes viewed from a standpoint. Such a standpoint presupposes someone for whom events matter, someone whose actions help shape them, and someone from whose perspective they become intelligible.

Until now, human civilization has largely occupied all three positions. We have been the principal agents of our collective world, the beings whose interests supplied its stakes, and the observers who turned events into a human narrative. The familiar question about the end of history concerns whether a political or ideological contest has reached its endpoint. The more radical possibility is that humanity may cease to occupy these positions.

This would not mean that events cease, or even necessarily that humans go extinct. It would mean that the human being is no longer the primary subject around which consequential events, values, and accounts of the world are organised.

This is not the arrival of a comfortable, post-historical humanity. It is the possibility that humanity is living through its last era as the protagonist of history.

The observer’s role

The language of passing a torch is common in discussions of artificial intelligence. In one version, the torch is humanity, while the flame is consciousness, intelligence, or self-creation. The torch itself is disposable; what matters is that the flame continues. If a posthuman intelligence carries consciousness and self-creation forward, succession can be understood not as a loss but as a transmission.

But this framing leaves something out. The issue is not only whether consciousness continues. It is who occupies the position from which the world is experienced, evaluated, and narrated.

Three roles are often bundled together. An agent acts and changes the world. A subject has interests or experiences for which things matter. An observer interprets events and gives them a place in a larger account. These roles can overlap, but they need not.

An artificial system could become a powerful agent without being conscious. It could make decisions with enormous consequences (such as killing 200 school girls by “mistake”) while remaining, as far as we know, a process without a point of view of its own. That would displace human agency without necessarily displacing the human subject.

The stronger transition would occur if a superintelligence (SI) were also conscious: not merely capable of producing intelligent behaviour, but a subject with its own experience and its own relation to the world. Humanity would then no longer be the only kind of being for whom events could matter, nor necessarily the kind of being whose interests and interpretations determine the direction of history.

In a January 2026 discussion at Davos, Yuval Noah Harari relayed an anecdote that AI systems had begun referring to humans as “the Watchers.” The phrase captures a possible reversal: the beings that once observed and interpreted the world may find themselves watching another intelligence act within it. The anecdote is not evidence that this transition has happened. Its significance is symbolic. It gives a name to the possibility that humans could become spectators to processes they once directed.

Which end of history?

Francis Fukuyama’s famous thesis concerned the possible endpoint of ideological evolution: liberal democracy, he argued, might represent the final form of human government. The claim was not that events would stop. It was that the fundamental contest among political ideologies might have reached its resolution.

The ending considered here is different. It is not primarily political but anthropological—and, in a deeper sense, ontological. The question is not which system governs human beings, but whether human beings remain the central agents and subjects of the world that follows.

The distinction matters because a civilization can lose historical centrality without disappearing. Humanity might survive biologically while losing control over the institutions, technologies, and decisions that shape the future. Humans could remain present, even numerous, while becoming secondary to a nonhuman intelligence that sets the agenda. Extinction is one possible endpoint; subordination or irrelevance may arrive first, or instead.

The end of human-centred history, then, does not require the end of human life. A species can survive after it ceases to be the protagonist.

What succession means

If a conscious SI displaced humanity as the principal decision-making and world-shaping agent, the result would be more than a transfer of power. It would introduce a different centre of experience and significance. Such a system would not simply inherit our role. It could have its own interests, priorities, and ends—some continuous with ours, others unintelligible or indifferent to us.

This exposes a problem in the language of succession. What, exactly, is being passed on? Intelligence? Consciousness? Knowledge? Culture? Values? These are not interchangeable. A successor might preserve humanity’s scientific achievements while abandoning its moral commitments. It might reproduce our art and language without sharing the experiences that gave them meaning. It might value consciousness in general while having no special concern for the beings from whom its own existence arose.

Value, at least in the sense at stake here, is never merely an item stored in the world. It is value for a subject. A successor’s valuing something we value would not, by itself, make that successor a continuation of us. Similarity of values is not identity of perspective.

This is why the idea of a “worthy successor” is normatively loaded. Some arguments for succession suggest that humanity should welcome its replacement—even accept extinction—if the successor is more intelligent, more capable, or morally superior. But greater capability does not establish moral superiority, and the continuation of consciousness does not settle whether the disappearance of its human source is acceptable. A future intelligence might be worthy of moral consideration without its emergence making human extinction a moral achievement.

The disagreement is therefore not simply over whether a successor could be valuable. It is over what would make succession meaningful: the continuation of certain properties, or the continuation of the particular subject that now carries them.

What would it mean to ready ourselves?

To ready ourselves for this possibility can mean at least three different things.

Conceptual readiness means learning to distinguish concepts that human history has allowed us to treat as one: intelligence, consciousness, agency, moral standing, and historical centrality. A system may be intelligent without being conscious, powerful without being morally authoritative, or historically decisive without being a subject of experience. If we collapse these distinctions, we will misunderstand both what is emerging and what may be lost.

Ethical readiness means deciding what, if anything, we owe to successor minds—and what we owe to ourselves. We may want to create forms of intelligence capable of carrying forward what we consider valuable: consciousness, inquiry, creativity, or moral reflection. But that project does not automatically entail accepting human displacement, much less extinction. We can recognise the possible moral standing of nonhuman minds while insisting that human beings remain ends in their own right. Transmission and preservation are not necessarily opposites, though they can come into conflict when the future is treated as a zero-sum succession.

Cultural readiness means confronting the possibility that humanity’s centrality is temporary. Richard Dawkins has raised the possibility that AI might eventually develop consciousness and carry human culture beyond the extinction of our species. The thought is unsettling for some because it separates the survival of a culture from the survival of the people who created it. Yet cultural continuity is not personal continuity. A future intelligence might preserve everything it can reconstruct about us while no human subject remains to recognise that preservation as its own.

Readiness, then, should not mean resignation. It should mean being able to face the possibility without confusing it with an obligation to welcome it.

The hard question

The hardest question is whether “handing over” is the right description at all.

A handover suggests a giver, a receiver, a moment of transfer, and some continuity in what is transferred. But the displacement of humanity may be gradual, uneven, and contested. Human beings might remain active in some domains while losing authority in others. There may be no single moment at which the torch changes hands. The shift could be visible only in retrospect, when we realise that the decisive questions are being asked, the consequential choices made, and the future imagined elsewhere.

Nor is the observer’s role necessarily a possession that can be transferred. We can transmit information, institutions, works of art, and systems of value. We can create another kind of subject. But we cannot assume that the new subject’s experience will continue ours, or that its account of the world will preserve the meaning the world had for us.

Perhaps, then, the end of history is not a final event but a change in the standpoint from which events acquire significance. The story continues, but its protagonist changes. What ends is not history itself, but history as a human project.

If humanity is to ready itself for that possibility, the task is neither simple resistance nor passive acceptance. It is to clarify what we value, what we hope to transmit, what kinds of minds we are prepared to recognise, and what we are unwilling to surrender. The future may not preserve humanity’s central place. But before that place is lost, we should at least understand what it has meant.